The explanatory gap refers to the unresolved pivotal question how physical properties (e.g., electrochemical signals) give rise to the qualitative experiences (quale). This “hard problem” has far-reaching ramifications for cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence research. Psilocybin and related psychoactive compounds might help to bridge this gap. Such psychoactive compounds  effect both the brain and its neural circuitry in a quantitative manner (via specific neurochemical mechanisms) and perception and consciousness in a qualitative manner. However, correlation does not equal causation (a common logical fallacy which is deeply rooted in our cognitive system).

Pertinent References

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